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RUMMEL V. ESTELLE:
CAN NON-CAPITAL PUNISHMENT STILL
BE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL?
The eighth amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits
the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments.1 The phrase "cruel and
unusual punishments" first appeared in the English Bill of Rights of
1689.2 In England, this phrase prohibited disproportionate penalties.'
The framers of the United States Constitution, however, intended the
language to ban only torture and other barbarous punishment.4
The United States Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the
eighth amendment as prohibiting torture," but has never applied the
eighth amendment to hold a sentence unconstitutional based solely upon
a disproportionately long sentence. Nevertheless, several lower courts
have found a basis for a proportionality principle in the Supreme Court's
treatment of other eighth amendment cases and in the historical origins
of the phrase "cruel and unusual punishments."7 In Rummel v. Estelle,8
the Supreme Court once again addressed the cruel and unusual punish-
ment issue. In a five to four decision,9 the Court held that a mandatory
' U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The eighth amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
Id. The Supreme Court has interpreted the eighth amendment as fully applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962);
see Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947).
2 I W. & M. 2, c.2, 189 (1689).
See Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted." The Original Mean-
ing, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 860 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Granucci]. Prior to Granucci's arti-
cle on the origins of the eighth amendment, most scholars believed that the prohibition
originally banned only torturous punishments as administered during the English treason
trials of 1685. Id. at 853; see, e.g., G. EDWARDS, S. ROSENZWEIG, S. RUBIN, H. WEIHOFEN, THE
LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 363-64 (1963); Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 635, 636 (1966).
'See Granucci, supra note 3, at 840-42; 2 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 111 (2d ed. 1881); 3 J.
ELLIOT, id. at 447-48, 52; 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 782-83 (1789).
1 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 319, 322 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(three particular death sentences cruel and unusual); Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126, 136
(1903) (10 years imprisonment for conspiracy to defraud not torture and, therefore, not cruel
and unusual punishment); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134-36 (1878) (execution by gun-
shot not torture and, therefore, not cruel and unusual punishment).
' See Mulligan, Cruel and Unusual Punishments: The Proportionality Rule, 47 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 639, 646 (1979).
1 See, e.g., Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 139-40 (4th Cir. 1973), cert denied, 415 U.S.
938 (1974); State v. Freitas, 61 Hawaii 262, 602 P.2d 914, 920 (1979); State v. Beavers, 382
So.2d 943, 944 (La. 1980); State v. Maldonado, 176 Mont. 322, 578 P.2d 296, 304-05 (1978). See
generally Campbell, Revival of the Eighth Amendment Development of Cruel-Punishment
Doctrine by the Supreme Court, 16 STAN. L. REV. 996 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Campbell].
445 U.S. 263 (1980), affg 587 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1978).
445 U.S. at 264. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief
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life sentence, imposed under Texas' recidivist statute, did not constitute
cruel and unusual punishment.10
Rummel received a mandatory life sentence following his third
felony conviction.11 His offenses, committed over a nine-year period, con-
sisted of fraudulently using a credit card to obtain approximately $80.00
worth of goods or services, forging a $28.36 check, and obtaining $120.75
by false pretenses.12 Although the offenses were felonies when com-
mitted, they were non-violent, and the net proceeds of all three crimes
totalled less than $230.00.13 Texas' recidivist statute, however, does not
consider these potentially mitigating factors."
Following the imposition of the mandatory life sentence, Rummel ap-
pealed through the state and federal courts." The Texas appellate courts
rejected Rummel's direct appeal as well as his subsequent collateral at-
tacks on his imprisonment. 6 Rummel then filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas.17 His petition alleged that his life sentence was so
disproportionate to the crimes he had committed as to constitute cruel
and unusual punishment. 8 Rummel did not contest the basic constitu-
tionality of the Texas recidivist statute. 9 The district court rejected this
Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White, and Blackmun joined. Justice Stewart filed a
concurring opinion, and Justice Powell filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens joined. Id.
1 Id at 285. Under Texas law anyone convicted of three non-capital felonies shall
receive a mandatory life sentence. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 63 (Vernon 1925). Despite
some slight changes, the recently revised Texas Code still provides for the same penalty.
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974).
" Rummel v. Estelle, 509 S.W.2d 630, 631, 634 (Tex. 1974); see note 10 supra.
" 445 U.S. at 265-66. In 1964 Rummel pleaded guilty to fraudulently using a credit card
to obtain approximately $80.00 worth of goods or services and received a sentence of three
years imprisonment. The statute under which the court convicted Rummel provided for two
to ten years' imprisonment. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 1555b(4)(d) (Vernon Supp. 1973).
In 1969 Rummel received a sentence of four years imprisonment for forgery. The statute in
force at that time provided for a two to five-year sentence. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. art.
996 (Vernon 1961). Rummel received his life sentence after being convicted of obtaining
money by false pretenses which carried a sentence of two to ten years' imprisonment. See
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. arts. 1410, 1413, 1421 (Vernon 1953).
" See note 12 supra. Rummel's third offense, obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses, is
now a Class A misdemeanor. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 7 §§ 31.03(b)(1) & .03(d)(3) (Vernon
1974 & Supp. 1977). Class A misdemeanors carry maximum jail terms of one year. TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 3 § 12.21 (Vernon 1974).
" See note 10 supra. The Texas recidivist statute requires a mandatory life sentence
following a third felony conviction, regardless of the type of felonies involved. Id.
,' 445 U.S. at 286 (Powell, J., dissenting).
18 445 U.S. at 267.
17 Id. at 264-65.
Id. at 267.
Id. at 268. The Supreme Court had already held that Texas' recidivist statute is con-
stitutional. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 569 (1967). Traditionally, courts have held
recidivist statutes constitutional, despite attacks on grounds other than the eighth amend-
ment. The first attack concerns due process challenges under the fifth and fourteenth
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claim, but a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
and found Rummel's sentence unconstitutional." The panel, however,
also granted a motion for a rehearing en banc.2 At the rehearing the
Fifth Circuit vacated the panel decision and reinstated Rummel's
sentence.? Following grant of certiorari," the Supreme Court affirmed
the Fifth Circuit opinion and held that Rummel's life sentence was not
cruel and unusual punishment.'
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court rejected both Rummel's
proportionality argument and his analysis of eighth amendment prece-
dent. Rummel contended that prior Supreme Court cases utilized a pro-
portionality test as an indicator of cruel and unusual punishment and
urged the Court to apply that test in his case." The majority refuted
Rummel's argument by pointing out that nearly all of the cases employ-
ing a proportionality test involved capital punishment.28 The Supreme
Court distinguished the relevant capital punishment cases by emphasiz-
ing the unique nature of the death penalty.' Accordingly, the majority
held that capital punishment cases were of limited assistance in deciding
the constitutionality of Rummel's sentence.?
The majority also distinguished an earlier Supreme Court case,
Weems v. United States," in which the Court applied a proportionality
amendments. Courts have dismissed due process arguments reasoning that although the
statutes impose a more severe penalty on recidivists, no separate offense is charged. See,
e.g., Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 625 (1912); Beland v. United States, 128 F.2d
795, 797 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 676 (1942). The second attack alleges that recidivist
statutes violate the constitutional provision against ex post facto laws. See U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 9. Courts generally have held such an argument invalid if the recidivist statute was in
operation prior to the last offense. See, e.g., Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948); Wey
Him Fong v. United States, 287 F.2d 525, 526 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 971 (1961).
Since courts impose an extended sentence only for the most recent offense, courts
have also rejected fifth amendment double jeopardy arguments. See, e.g., 334 U.S. at 732;
224 U.S. at 623; McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 313 (1901). Courts have also
dismissed equal protection arguments under the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., 180 U.S.
at 313; Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673, 677-78 (1895); Barr v. State, 205 Ind. 481, 187 N.E.
259, 262 (1933).
1 Rummel v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1193, 1200 (5th Cir.) (2-1 decision holding Rummel's
sentence unconstitutional), rev'd, 587 F.2d 651, 662 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
"1 568 F.2d at 1203.
2 587 F.2d 651, 662 (5th Cir.) (8-6 en banc decision held Rummel's sentence constitu-
tional), rev'g 568 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1978); see Comment, Rummel v. Estelle: Leaving the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in Constitutional Limbo, 15 VAL. U.L. REV. 201,
204-05 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Constitutional Limbo].
2 441 U.S. 960 (1979).
'A 445 U.S. 285.
1 Id. at 272-73.
" Id. at 272. The Court observed that the death penalty differs from other penalties
not in degree, but in kind since the penalty is totally irrevocable, rejects rehabilitation, and
is an absolute renunciation, of humanity. Id.; Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
2' 445 U.S. at 272.
2 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
1981]
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test to strike down a non-capital punishment."0 In Weems, the Court held
that a fifteen-year sentence at cadena temporal,3 imposed by a Phillipine
court for falsification of an official document, violated the eighth amend-
ment.2 The Rummel Court distinguished Weems on the grounds that
Weems' punishment was cruel and unusual punishment, not due to the
sentence's length, but in light of the torturous accompaniments associ-
ated with the sentence.3 Therefore, the Rummel Court concluded that
the unique nature of Weems' punishment distinguished that case just as
the unique nature of the death penalty distinguished the capital punish-
ment cases.'
The majority cited the Supreme Court cases of Badders v. United
States5 and Graham v. West Virginia" in support of its conclusion that a
proportionality test was not applicable in Rummel." Both cases involved
non-capital punishment and were decided soon after the Weems case.'
The Rummel Court found particularly significant the fact that the
Supreme Court dismissed the eighth amendment challenges in both
cases, without any discussion or analysis."
Following the analysis of precedent, the Rummel majority empha-
sized the need for judicial restraint in order to avoid usurping the
legislative function of establishing specific criminal penalties."0 The
Court noted that Texas, in mandating Rummel's sentence, was in-
terested in more than establishing the penalty for unlawfully acquiring
another person's property. 1 The majority emphasized that Texas' over-
riding concern was in punishing those who had shown, by repeated
criminal acts, that they were simply incapable of conforming their
behavior to the law."2 The majority thus dismissed Rummel's claim that
' 445 U.S. at 272-74; 217 U.S. at 380-82. Mr. Justice Field first proposed a propor-
tionality test for eighth amendment violations. O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40
(1892) (Field, J., dissenting).
s Cadena temporal is a Hispanic punishment consisting of confinement in a penal in-
stitution; hard and painful labor while bound by a chain at the ankle and wrist; and depriva-
tion of marital authority, parental and property rights. Following confinement, the person
remains under the perpetual supervision of the criminal magistrate. 217 U.S. at 366.
1 217 U.S. at 382. The Phillipine Islands were a United States territory, and Weems
was an official in the United States Government of the Phillipines. Therefore, the United
States Supreme Court had jurisdiction to review the decision of the Phillipine Supreme
Court. See id at 359-61.
445 U.S. at 274.
3 Id.
240 U.S. 391 (1916) (five years imprisonment and $7,000 fine not cruel and unusual
punishment for seven counts of mail fraud).
224 U.S. 616 (1912) (mandatory life sentence following third horse theft not cruel and
unusual punishment).
445 U.S. at 274, 276-77.
See notes 35-36 supra.
Id.; see Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 393-94 (1916); Graham v. West
Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 631 (1912).
41 445 U.S. at 276, 284-85.




his offenses were petty and non-violent, reasoning that violence and the
value of goods involved are not always relevent.'3
Although the majority specifically rejected the use of a propor-
tionality analysis in examining Rummel's sentence," the Court did
discuss the criteria Rummel offered as evidence of disproportionality.'
5
The Court, however, found little merit in Rummel's application of the
proposed factors and dismissed both his arguments and conclusion."8
Rummel attempted to ground his proportionality attack on the excep-
tional severity of Texas' recidivist statute and the petty and non-violent
nature of his offenses. 7 The majority refuted Rummel's claim that
Texas' statute was uniquely severe by pointing out that in the absence
of mandated uniform laws, inimical to federalism, some state will always
bear the distinction of treating particular offenders more severely than
other states. 8
In evaluating Rummel's contentions, the majority also weighed
Texas' practice of allowing a prisoner serving a life sentence to obtain
parole. 9 Although the majority observed that it could not treat the
possibility of parole in twelve years as a twelve-year sentence, the Court
held that a proper assessment of the imposed penalty could not ignore
that possibility.0 The majority found that at the very least the possi-
bility of parole mitigated the relative severity of Texas' statute. 1 The
majority concluded the opinion by reemphasizing the need for judicial
, Id. at 275-76. The majority argued that the presence or absence of violence does not
always reflect society's interest in deterring a particular crime or punishing a particular
criminal. The Court observed that white collar crimes are characterized by non-violence and
yet do not go unpunished. Id at 275. White collar crime, however, is inherently non-violent
and the sentences .imposed reflect that fact. Certainly courts do not impose life sentences
for white collar crimes. See White Collar Crime Symposium Part II, 17 AM. CaRM. L. REV.
409-18, 479-500 (1980). The majority argued that culpability does not quantitatively relate to
the gain realized. As an example, the majority states that if Rummel had attempted to
defraud his victim of $50,000, but had failed, no money whatsoever would have changed
hands. Yet, Rummel would be no less blameworthy, only less skillful, than if he had succeeded.
445 U.S. at 276.
" 445 U.S. at 274.
,5 Id. at 277-82.
, See id at 285.
"7 Id. at 277; see note 10 supra.
" Id at 282; see note 51 infra; text accompanying notes 70-73 infra. To support the
argument that various states punish the same crimes with different sentences, the Court
cited California's uniquely severe statute governing the theft of avocados and artichokes,
see CAL. PENAL CODE § 487(1) (West 1970), and compared the Idaho and Nevada statutes
dealing with the theft of $100. 445 U.S. at 282. Compare IDAHO CODE §§ 18-4604, -4607 (1979)
(fine or short jail term) with NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.220 (1973) (up to 10 years' imprisonment).
'" 445 U.S. at 280-81.
0 Id.
11 Id. at 281. The majority cited Mississippi's recidivist statute as being more severe
since it mandates a life sentence without parole upon conviction of three felonies, provided
that at least one of the felonies involves violence. Id.; see MIss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-83 (Supp.
1979).
19811
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restraint and the importance of respecting the decision of the Texas
legislature.5"
Justice Powell's vigorous dissent disputed the majority's findings and
holding and determined that Rummel's life sentence was cruel and
unusual punishment." Analyzing the history of the eighth amendment,
the dissent concluded that the penalty imposed for a non-capital crime
can be unconstitutionally disproportionate." This conclusion rested on
a historical analysis of the eighth amendment combined with the princi-
ple of disproportionality.55 To establish the legitimacy of a proportion-
ality analysis in non-capital eighth amendment cases, the dissent relied
on Weems and other Supreme Court cases. 8 The dissent maintained that
the Supreme Court in Weems found that the length of a sentence alone
could be the basis of an eighth amendment claim and that later Supreme
Court cases recognized this principle." The dissent stated that a propor-
tionality analysis is appropriate in all cases and is required and recognized
by Supreme Court precedent.' The dissent distinguished the two cases
upon which the majority relied for the proposition that a proportionality
analysis was not applicable to Rummel's punishment." Powell urged that
both Badders and Graham involved superficial eighth amendment claims
that are meritless in considering the applicability of a proportionality
analysis.
The dissent also disputed the majority's characterization of
Rummel's sentence."' Powell's dissent focused on the fact that since
Rummel had no constitutional or inherent right to parole, the possibility
of parole did not ameliorate the severity of his sentence.2 The dissent
445 U.S. at 284.
Id. at 285-307 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 286-93.
I. at 288-93.
Id at 290; see note 57 infra.
5 445 U.S. at 290 (Powell, J., dissenting). The dissent maintained that in both capital
and non-capital cases the Supreme Court has recognized that the Weems decision pro-
scribes punishment grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime. Id.; Hutto v. Fin-
ney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977); see Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (opinion of White, J.); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171
(1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 325
(1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
445 U.S. at 290 (Powell, J., dissenting); see note 57 supra.
445 U.S. at 290 n.7 (Powell, J., dissenting); see notes 35-36 supra; text accompanying
notes 97-100 infra.
445 U.S. at 290 n.7 (Powell, J., dissenting); see notes 35-36 supra; text accompanying
notes 97-100 infra.
61 445 U.S. at 294 (Powell, J., dissenting).
" Id The dissent cited Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979), for
the proposition that a criminal conviction extinguishes whatever liberty interest a prisoner
has in securing freedom before the end of his lawful sentence. 445 U.S. at 293-94. Powell also
cited figures that illustrate the speculative nature of parole in Texas. In June of 1979, the
Governor of Texas refused to grant parole to 79% of the prisoners whom the state parole
board recommended for release. I. at 294 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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thus argued that a just evaluation of Rummel's sentence must consider
the sentence as life imprisonment.'
In addition to a different perception of Rummel's sentence, the dis-
sent disputed the majority's reliance on federalism and the need for
judicial restraint. Powell maintained that the eighth amendment, which
commands courts to enforce the constitutional limitation of the cruel and
unusual punishment clause, supersedes the policy of judicial restraint."
The dissent argued that judicial restraint and the enforcement of the
eighth amendment are not mutually exclusive."5 Powell noted that use of
objective factors in evaluating punishments provides the necessary
degree of judicial restraint and respect for federalism." The first objec-
tive factor the dissent relied upon in finding Rummel's sentence uncon-
situtional was the nature of the offense." Powell accepted Rummel's con-
tention that the offenses were petty and non-violent and stated that it
was difficult to imagine felonies that posed less danger to society.'
Therefore, the dissent concluded that the nature of the offenses did not
call for life imprisonment.
The severity of Texas' recidivist statute was the second objective
factor that the dissent considered. The dissent observed that only West
Virginia and Washington have statutes nearly as severe as Texas'.
Powell cited several state statutes and the federal habitual offender
statute to illustrate what he considered to be more acceptable legislative
schemes." The dissent cited these statutes as lending credence to the
445 U.S. at 294 (Powell, J., dissenting).
6u Id.
Id. at 303-04.
Id at 295. The dissent listed the factors and their authority as (i) the nature of the
offense, see Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977); id. at 603 (Powell, J., concurring and
dissenting); (ii) the sentence imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdic-
tions, see 433 U.S. at 593-94; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976); Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 380 (1910); and (iii) the sentence imposed upon other criminals in the
same jurisdiction, id. at 380-81.
" 445 U.S. at 295. The dissent characterized the nature of Rummers offenses as the
non-violent use of fraud to obtain small sums of money. Id.
es I.
1 Id. at 296. At the time of Rummel's conviction only Texas, Washington, and West
Virginia provided mandatory life imprisonment upon the commission of a third non-violent
felony. Id.
71 Id. at 297-99 (Powell, J., dissenting). Recidivist statutes that the dissent found more
acceptable than Texas' include a flexible scheme taking circumstances into account. Id. at
297-99 citing see, e.g., KY. PENAL CODE ANN. § 532.080 (1978). The dissent also favorably
cited statutes requiring the commission of more than three offenses. See, e.g., COLO. REV.
STAT. § 16-13-101(2) (1978). The dissent also considered more acceptable statutes requiring the
commission of at least one violent crime. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 11, §§ 4214-4215
(1975 & Supp. 1978); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-83 (Supp. 1979). Finally, those statutes that
limit a mandatory penalty to less than life and those that grant discretion to the sentencing
authority the dissent saw as more acceptable. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-17 (Supp.
1979) (persons who have committed two felonies punishable by at least one year in prison
receive four years additional sentence upon the commission of a third felony and eight years
1981]
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view that a mandatory life sentence for the commission of three non-
violent felonies is unconstitutionally disproportionate.71
The final objective factor upon which the dissent relied was the
punishment that Texas provides for other criminals." First and second
offenders who commit far more serious crimes than Rummel committed
may receive markedly less severe sentences. 73 Even when sentencing
two-time offenders, Texas varies the amount of punishment with the
severity of the offenses committed. 7' The dissent argued that the imposi-
tion of the same punishment, life imprisonment, upon persons who have
committed completely different types of crimes raises serious doubts
about the constitutional proportionality of the sentence as applied to the
less harmful offender.75 The dissent concluded that while Rummel had
committed criminal acts and received a sentence that was not inherently
barbarous, the relationship between the acts and the sentence was
grossly and unconstitutionally disproportionate.78
The dissent insisted that the objective standards it applied were
proper and established the necessary degree of judicial restraint. The
experience of the Fourth Circuit in applying an objective test for the last
seven years provided support for this contention.78 The dissent charac-
terized the Fourth Circuit's experience as impressive empirical evidence
that federal courts are capable of applying the eighth amendment to
disproportionate non-capital offenses with a high degree of sensitivity to
the principles of federalism and state autonomy.
79
upon the commission of a fourth felony); WIs. STAT. § 939.62 (1977) (persons who have com-
mitted one felony within five years may receive 10 years additional sentence upon the com-
mission of offense punishable by term greater than 10 years); D.C. CODE § 22-104a (1973)
(persons committing three felonies may be sentenced to life); IDAHO CODE § 19-2514 (1979)
(persons who have committed three felonies may receive a sentence ranging from five years
to life).
' 445 U.S. at 300 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 300-02.
Id. at 300. The only first-time offender subject to a mandatory life sentence in Texas
is a person convicted of capital murder. TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 12.31, 19.03 (Vernon 1974). A
person who commits a second felony is punished as if he has committed a felony of the next
higher degree. Id. §§ 12.42(a)-.42(b); 445 U.S. at 301 (Powell, J., dissenting).
"' 445 U.S. at 301 (Powell, J., dissenting). Compare TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 12.42(a) and
31.07 (two time unauthorized use of vehicle) with §§ 12.42(b) and 21.02 (1974 and Supp. 1980)
(two rapes).
445 U.S. at 301 (Powell, J., dissenting).
78 Id at 302.
Id. at 304.
78 Id The Fourth Circuit first applied a proportionality test similar to that used by the
Rummel dissent in Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973). Hart was sentenced to life
imprisonment for issuing a $50.00 check with insufficient funds, transporting forged checks
totalling $140.00 across states lines, and perjury. 483 F.2d at 138. The Fourth Circuit con-
sidered the nature of the crime, the legislative purpose of the punishment, the punishment
for the same crime in other jurisdictions, and the punishment for unrelated crimes in the
same jurisdiction. Id. at 140-42. Based upon these consideration, Hart's sentence was found
to be cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 138.
445 U.S. at 304-06 (Powell, J., dissenting); see Davis v. Davis, 601 F.2d 153, 154 (4th
Cir. 1979), vacated sub nom., Hutto v. Davis, 445 U.S. 947, 947 (1980) (40-year prison
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The dissent concluded that by limiting a proportionality test to
capital punishment cases, the majority had chosen simply to draw the
easiest, but not the best line.s0 The dissent insisted that courts must ex-
tend a proportionality analysis to non-capital cases."' In closing, the dis-
sent appealed to common sense and claimed that virtually every layman
and lawyer would view Rummel's sentence as grossly unjust. 2 The dis-
sent concluded that Rummel's mandatory life sentence crossed any ra-
tional line separating lawful punishment from cruel and unusual punish-
ment. ' The dissent, therefore, found that life imprisonment is not intrin-
sically permissible.8
Three areas of contention exist between the majority and dissenting
opinions. The first distinction lies in the differing analyses of precedent.
The majority distinguished Weems on the basis of the accompaniments
associated with the sentence and the unique nature of the case.85 The dis-
sent regarded Weems as creating a proportionality analysis applicable
to a non-capital offense." The Weems case, however, can support either
conclusion. Although the accompaniments to the sentence were a factor
in finding Weems' sentence cruel and unusual," the Court recognized
that length of imprisonment alone can constitute cruel and unusual
punishment." The majority thus did not adequately consider that the
Weems Court relied, at least in part, on the length of the sentence to
find the punishment cruel and unusual.
sentence and $20,000 fine for possession and distribution of less than nine ounces marijuana
held cruel and unusual punishment); Roberts v. Collins, 544 F.2d 168, 170 (4th Cir. 1976)
(sentence imposed for lesser-included offense of assault held unconstitutional to extent
punishment exceeded maximum receivable for greater offense of assault with intent to
murder); Hall v. McKenzie, 537 F.2d 1232, 1236 (4th Cir. 1976) (10 to 20-year sentence for
statutory rape not cruel and unusual punishment); Griffin v. Warden, 517 F.2d 756, 757 (4th
Cir. 1975) (mandatory life sentence for breaking and entering, burglary, and grand larceny
not cruel and unusual punishment); United States v. Atkinson, 513 F.2d 38,42 (4th Cir. 1975)
(12-year sentence for possession and distribution of heroin not cruel and unusual punish-
ment); United States v. Wooten, 503 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir. 1974) (two-year sentence for
unlawful possession of firearm not cruel and unusual punishment); Wood v. South Carolina,
483 F.2d 149, 150 (4th Cir. 1973) (10-year sentence for two obscene telephone calls not cruel
and unusual punishment).





SSee text accompanying notes 29-34 supra.
445 U.S. at 290 (Powell, J., dissenting).
87 217 U.S. at 366, 372, 377, 380.
11 I1& at 377. Regarding Weems' punishment, the Supreme Court stated "[ult is cruel in
its excess of imprisonment and that which accompanies and follows imprisonment. ... Its
punishments come under the condemnation of the bill of rights both on account of their
degree and kind." I&. The Court held the sentence unconstitutional based on the length of
term and the accompanying deprivations. Id- at 382. Either ground would have been suffi-
cient for the Court's ruling of unconstitutionality. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
171-72 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. i
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The majority also eliminated capital punishment cases as precedent
on the basis of the unique nature of the death penalty.9 While the death
penalty is unique in its total irrevocability, the cases distinguished do
not require capital punishment as a prerequisite for a 'proportionality
analysis." The line the majority drew between capital punishment and
non-capital punishment cases is convenient, yet is not grounded in either
precendent or principle.9' All eighth amendment cases require the ap-
plication of a proportionality test according to the cases' unique factual
circumstances.
9 2
The majority relied upon Graham93 and Badders94 as controlling pre-
cedent for Rummel. 5 As the dissent illustrated, this was misplaced
reliance. Graham was a state case decided fifty years before the
Supreme Court extended the eighth amendment to the states.' Addi-
tionally, the entire discussion in Graham of the cruel and unusual punish-
ment allegation consisted of one sentence. In Badders, the Supreme
Court merely rejected the claim that a five-year sentence and a $7,000
fine for seven counts of mail fraud were cruel and unusual punishment."
Although discussion of the eighth amendment claim was again only one
sentence long, the conclusion is compatible with an implicit propor-
tionality test.' The dissent, therefore, properly applied and dis-
238, 325 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (Weems made it plain beyond reasonable doubt that
excessive punishments were as objectionable as those inherently cruel); Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (expatriation for wartime desertion cruel and unusual punishment);
Campbell, supra note 7, at 1007-08 (Court did not rely on element of physical cruelty in in-
validating Weems' sentence); Turkington, Unconstitutionally Excessive Punishments: An
Examination of the Eighth Amendment and the Weems Principle, 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 145, 147
(1967) (either the length of Weems' sentence or the accompaniments would have been suffi-
cient to make the sentence unconstitutional).
0 See text accompanying notes 25-28 supra.
'0 445 U.S. at 272; Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring);
see note 57 supra.
1 445 U.S. at 287-93 (Powell, J., dissenting); see Constitutional Limbo, supra note 22,
at 206-16.
445 U.S. at 293 (Powell, J., dissenting); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. at 366-67.
445 U.S. at 276; see note 36 supra.
445 U.S. at 274; see note 35 supra.
" 445 U.S. at 274, 276-77.
" 445 U.S. at 290 n.7 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. Graham was a state case decided in 1912. The Supreme Court did not clearly apply
the eighth amendment as a prohibition on state action until 1962. Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660, 666 (1962); see note 1 supra.
" 224 U.S. at 631.
" 240 U.S. at 393-94; see 445 U.S. at 290 n.7.
10 See 240 U.S. at 394. Badders seems compatible with a proportionality analysis. For
seven counts of mail fraud he received a five-year jail term and a $7,000 fine. Such punish-
ment does not seem grossly disproportionate to the offenses. Badders adds little to the
available knowledge of the scope of the eighth amendment. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 325 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). It only shows that the Court did not consider that a
five-year sentence for the commission of seven crimes was cruel and unusual. 445 U.S. at
290 n.7 (Povell, J., dissenting).
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tinguished available precedent. The majority drew previously undrawn
lines between capital and non-capital offenses, cavalierly discounted
Weems, and relied upon two inapplicable one sentence holdings."0 ' On
the basis of capital and non-capital punishment precedent, a propor-
tionality test was appropriate in Rummel.'
The second major difference between the majority and dissent con-
cerns the nature of Rummel's sentence. The majority determined that
the possibility of parole in twelve years mitigated Rummel's sentence. '
The dissent insisted that Rummel had no right to parole and the mere
possibility of the exercise of an executive privilege could not reduce the
severity of the sentence for eighth amendment consideration."' Specula-
tion on possible future parole is not a reasonable or proper foundation
for a judicial decision because there is no assurance that the state will
parole a particular prisoner."5 The dissent's assumption that Rummel
will spend his life in prison, therefore, is appropriate.
The third main difference between the majority and dissent involves
their respective opinions on the principles of judicial restraint and
federalism. The majority emphasized the need to respect the decision of
the Texas legislature in punishing recidivists and argued that judicial
restraint prohibits the federal judiciary from imposing its moral
judgments on the states."0 The objective factors that the dissent
employed, however, amount to a constitutionally mandated application
of the eighth amendment and not an imposition of a subjective moral
judgment.' 7 Since the eighth amendment is applicable to the states, the
dissent correctly concluded that applying the amendment cannot be in-
consistent with the principles of federalism.' 8
Courts should respect federalism during judicial scrutiny of state
laws, but it cannot serve to foreclose or limit the examination.' Con-
Il, See text accompanying notes 93-100 supra.
445 U.S. at 293 (Powell, J., dissenting); see text accompanying notes 85-93 supra.
103 445 U.S. at 280-81.
104 1& at 293-94.
oI Id at 294. Speculation regarding parole should be avoided as is speculation involving
a pardon for those convicted of capital offenses. See note 62 supra. The possibility of each
always exists, but neither should be considered in evaluating the sentence. Id. In Rummels
particular case, parole is no longer a question. Texas District Court Judge Doren Suttle had
granted Rummel a new trial on the claim that he had ineffective counsel at his 1973 trial. On
November 15, 1980, before the new trial could take place, Judge Prado released Rummel
following a plea-bargaining agreement. The terms of the agreement were that his sentence
would be reduced to time served and that the state would drop the habitual offender indict-
ment. The fact that Rummel's third offense is now a misdemeanor, see note 13 supra, was
apparently a key factor in the bargain.
11 445 U.S. at 283-84.
0, d. at 295 (Powell, J., dissenting); see note 66 supra.
"' 445 U.S. at 303 (Powell, J., dissenting); see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 466
(1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378-79 (1910); see
note 1 supra.
"0 See note 108 supra.
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sidering the states' obligation to follow the eighth amendment, the
judiciary should not hestitate to evaluate their performances. As the dis-
sent and Fourth Circuit cases illustrate, courts may apply objective
factors to state decisions to determine whether a specific action falls
within the constitutional framework."' The experience of the Fourth Cir-
cuit exemplifies the efficacy of the proportionality test and its com-
patibility with the theories of judicial restraint and federalism.' The
majority's reliance on these two theories to discard Rummel's eighth
amendment claim has given the state legislatures unbounded discretion
in this area and has confused the lower courts.
Cases decided since Rummel illustrate the confusion the Supreme
Court's decision and logic created in the lower courts."1 Courts that had
consistently applied a proportionality analysis are now struggling to
reconcile Rummel with their view of the eighth amendment."' The Third
Circuit misread Rummel and may continue to apply a proportionality
test to non-capital cases."" Using the Rummel fact situation as a yard-
stick, the Third Circuit held they would not consider a cruel and unusual
punishment allegation unless the punishment in question was even more
disproportionate than in Rummel's case."' While this interpretation of
Rummel was unusual, Rummel affords some basis for the opinion that a
proportionality argument may still be appropriate in a non-capital of-
fense. Footnote eleven of the majority opinion provides that a propor-
tionality principle might be appropriate in an extreme case."' The Third
Circuit's initial reading of Rummel as providing evidence of the
minimum requirement to establish a successful eighth amendment pro-
portionality attack on criminal sentences, therefore, is a possible inter-
pretation.
Footnote eleven, however, is inconsistent with the logic of the ma-
jority opinion. The Supreme Court placed heavy reliance upon the
distinction between capital and non-capital punishment." 7 The majority
stated that the length of an imposed sentence is purely a matter of
legislative prerogative but immediately contradicted that broad state-
ment in a footnote.1 '8 Footnote eleven undermines the credibility of the
" 445 U.S. at 304 (Powell, J., dissenting); see text accompanying notes 78-79 supra.
445 U.S. at 304 (Powell, J., dissenting); see notes 7 and 79 supra.
Il See notes 114-131 infra.
113 Id
. See Virgin Islands v. Berry, 631 F.2d 214, 218 (3d Cir. 1980).
"Id. Berry pleaded guilty to his second felony, second-degree murder, and received a
sentence of 35 years imprisonment with parole possible in 10 years. The Third Circuit held
that if Rummel's sentence was not so grossly disproportionate as to amount to cruel and
unusual punishment, then the court could not conclude that Berry's sentence was grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime committed. Id The Third Circuit thus found no
violation of the eighth amendment. Id.
1 445 U.S. at 274 n.11. The majority admitted that a review of a life sentence for over-
time parking would require a proportionality test. Id
Id at 275.
Id. at 274, 274 n.11.
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majority opinion by stating that a proportionality principle might come
into play in an extreme case; the majority admitted that a review of a
sentence of life imprisonment for overtime parking would require a pro-
portionality test. 9 While it is difficult to envision a more extreme case
than Rummel, the dissent's logic apparently compelled the inclusion of
footnote eleven.12 The contradictory note and the majority's discussion
of Rummel's proposed factors combine to undermine the Court's ruling
against a proportionality test. The footnote provides a route for future
modification or reversal of the Court's ruling.
The Fifth Circuit, whose decision the Supreme Court affirmed,12" ' has
seized upon footnote eleven to conclude that a proportionality principle
remains applicable to challenges involving length of a sentence. 2 While
admitting that one might conclude from Rummel that a sentence cannot
be disproportionate solely because of excessive length,"= the Fifth Cir-
cuit emphasized both footnote eleven and the fact that the majority
stated that capital cases were of "limited", rather than "no" assistance
in preserving a proportionality analysis. 24 The Fifth Circuit also pointed
out that the Supreme Court evaluated Rummel's contentions and did not
dismiss them peremptorily.'5 In an imaginative reading of Rummel, the
Fifth Circuit found that the Supreme Court's conclusion that Rummel's
sentence conformed to the eighth amendment was based on the deter-
mination that, on the facts of that case, Rummel's sentence was not
grossly disproportionate to the severity of his offenses.2 ' The Third and
Fifth Circuits both misread Rummel as preserving some type of propor-
tionality test for non-capital offenses'
Several states also have preserved that proportionality principle for
non-capital punishment by either explicitly circumventing Rummel or
continuing the application of a proportionality test."8 Kansas courts have
specifically repudiated Rummel by requiring a proportionality test in
evaluating all sentences.' The Kansas Supreme Court based the holding
119 Id
120 Id.
1" Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
12 Terrebonne v. Blackburn, 624 F.2d 1363, 1366-67 (5th Cir. 1980).
123 Id.
" Id. at 1367.
m Id.
120 Id
I The Third Circuit in Virgin Islands v. Berry preserved a proportionality test using
the Rummel fact situation as a yardstick. 631 F.2d at 218; see notes 114-115 supra. The Fifth
Circuit retained the proportionality test they employed in Rummel. Rummel v. Estelle, 587
F.2d 651, 659-60 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc); see Terrebonne v. Blackburn, 624 F.2d 1363, 1368
(5th Cir. 1980). The Fifth Circuit test looks at the nature of the offense, compares the penalty to
that imposed by others, and compares the punishments imposed by the sentencing jurisdiction
on other criminals. 624 F.2d at 1368.
1 See notes 133-135 infra.
12 See State v. Weigel, 228 Kan. 195, 612 P.2d 636, 645 (1980); State v. McDaniel, 228
Kan. 172, 612 P.2d 1231, 1242 (1980).
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on its interpretation of a Kansas constitutional amendment identical to
the eighth amendment of the Federal Constitution. 0 The courts in
Nevada and Washington have also continued to apply a proportionality
test in non-capital cases.13 The rejections and misapplication of Rummel
illustrate confusion and disagreement with the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause as applied to non-
capital offenses. Other states are likely to reject Rummel and find that
their state constitutions also require a proportionality test. 3 '
In addition to differences regarding the scope and meaning of the
eighth amendment, states have practical reasons for retaining a propor-
tionality test for non-capital offenses. Above all, the proportionality test
provides flexibility. In each case courts may weigh objective factors such
as the presence or absence of violence, the harm done to society, and the
reprehensibility of the offenses.'" The Rummel test is inflexible, par-
ticularly when courts must impose mandatory penalties." The propor-
tionality test provides for judicial scrutiny over otherwise unbridled
legislative authority. Life imprisonment, like capital punishment, may
also be cruel and unusual for certain crimes. A proportionality test for
non-capital offenses would enforce the eighth amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishments.
The Supreme Court- cannot easily modify its holding in Rummel.
State courts, however, are likely to hold that their state constitutions
provide greater protection than the Federal Constitution to preserve
the proportionality test for non-capital offenses.,' Until the Supreme
Court overrules Rummel either explicitly or by adopting a circuit court's
innovative reading of Rummel, the Court will have to continue holding
all punishments of imprisonment alone to be constitutional, regardless of
the length of imprisonment or the crime involved.
EDWARD J. BEDFORD
" KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 9.
,., See Deveroux v. State, 96 Nev. -, 610 P.2d 722, 722-23 (1980) (per curiam) (eight
years' imprisonment for grand larceny not so disproportionate as to be unconstitutional);
State v. Smith, 93 Wash.2d 329, 344-45, 610 P.2d 869, 879 (1980) (five-year sentence suspend-
ed and three years probation for drug violation not so disproportionate as to be cruel and
unusual punishment).
" The hypothesis that other states will establish a proportionality test under their
state constitutions is based upon the state courts' prior acceptance of a proportionality prin-
ciple. See note 7 supra.
' 445 U.S. at 295 (Powell, J., dissenting); see note 79 supra.
II The combination of mandatory penalties and the absence of a proportionality test
removes discretion from both the sentencing and appellate courts. See note 70 supra.
"I See text accompanying notes 128-132 supra.
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